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The Role of the International Seabed
Authority in the 1980's
ELISABETH MANN BORGESE*
The most important contribution of the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence to the building of a new international economic order is the
proposal for the establishment of an International Seabed Au-
thority. However, many of the provisions for the Authority's ac-
tivities are made inoperable by developments partly beyond the
control of the Law of the Sea Conference. This article proposes
ways and means to adjust the activities of the Authority to this
new situation, within the terms of the Draft Convention itself and
building further upon them.
From the very outset the concept of the common heritage of
mankind integrated the goals of disarmament and development.
As originally proposed by the delegation of Malta in 1967 and sub-
sequently developed through the various negotiating texts, the in-
ternational seabed has been reserved exclusively for peaceful
purposes. Its resources are to be utilized for the benefit of man-
kind as a whole, taking into particular consideration the interests
and needs of developing countries.
Although today it seems obvious, in the sixties nobody thought
of joining disarmament and development goals and means, and
thus it was natural that the United Nations quickly disjoined the
disarmament and development aspects which Ambassador Pardo
had joined in the common heritage concept. The disarmament as-
pect of the concept, derived from the reservation of the seabed
exclusively for peaceful purposes, was assigned to the Disarma-
ment Committee. The development aspect of the concept, derived
from the requirement that resources be exploited for the benefit
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of mankind as a whole, was assigned to the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea. Both committees have more
or less completed their assignments. In 1971 the Disarmament
Committee produced the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Em-
placement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass De-
struction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil
Thereof (Seabed Disarmament Treaty).' In 1980 the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea produced the Draft
Convention on the Law of the Sea 2 which was to be signed in
1981.
Significant developments have taken place in the last ten years
at both the conceptual and the technical level. The purpose of
this paper is to show that the time has come to integrate disarma-
ment and development goals in the new international order of the
oceans. In addition this paper will suggest some means to
achieve this integration.
LAW OF THE SEA AND THE SEABED DISARMAMENT TREATY
The Seabed Disarmament Treaty has been criticized on many
grounds. Its scope, being limited to nuclear weapons and weap-
ons of mass destruction, has been found inadequate. The area to
which it was to apply has been considered insufficient, both hori-
zontally (since it excludes a twelve-mile zone seaward of the
baseline from which the territorial sea is measured) and verti-
cally (since it permits atomic weapons on "crawlers" a few inches
above the seafloor, as well as on submarines).
The most heated debates have focused on the problem of verifi-
cation of compliance with treaty requirements. Article I assigns
to "each State partyto the treaty the right to verify through ob-
servation the activities of other States parties to the treaty on the
seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the
zones of national jurisdiction." This provision was difficult to ac-
cept for States that did not possess the requisite technologies for
such inspections. The subsequent long, drawn-out procedures for
consultation and cooperation among State parties, and the even-
tual recourse to the Security Council, appeared inadequate to se-
cure the purposes of the treaty. 3
During the negotiations preceding the adoption of the treaty,
the majority of states pressed for the internationalization of con-
1. Done Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337.
2. U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/WP.1/Rev. 3 (1980).
3. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and. in the Subsoil Thereofi
done Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.IA.S. No. 7337 at art. 1.
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trols. A number of proposals were advanced, including the propo-
sal of a special body responsible for the surveillance of seabed
installations and for monitoring compliance with the prescriptions
of the treaty. Others suggested that existing international organi-
zations could be entrusted with that task. Canada proposed that
the Secretary-General of the United Nations be given a major role
in controlling verification procedures.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union objected to the in-
ternationalization of verification procedures. They considered it
unnecessary, premature, and costly to establish a special body
and equip it with the necessary technology.4 The Seabed Author-
ity did not exist at that time, and nobody could predict what form
it would take. In 1981 the situation is entirely different. The In-
ternational Seabed Authority is being established by the Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea.5 Its responsibilities are wide-ranging 6
its structure is elaborate. Among other things, it is endowed with
specific organs and powers for monitoring, surveillance, and verifi-
cation. Article 165 of the Draft Convention provides that the Le-
gal and Technical Commission shall:
Make recommendations to the Council regarding the establishment of a
monitoring programme which shall observe, measure, evaluate and ana-
lyze by recognized scientific methods on a regular basis the risks and ef-
fects of activities in the Area with respect to pollution of the marine
environment, ensure that existing regulations are adequate and complied
with and co-ordinate the implementation of the monitoring programme
approved by the Council.7
The Commission shall also:
Make recommendations to the Council regarding the direction and super-
vision of a staff of inspectors who shall inspect activities in the Area to de-
termine whether the provisions of this Part, the rules, regulations and
procedures prescribed thereunder, and the terms and conditions of any
contract with the Authority are being complied with.8
Finally, "[t]he members of the Commission shall, upon request
by any State party or other party concerned, be accompanied by a
representative of such State Party or other party concerned when
4. Goldblat, The Seabed Treaty, in 1 OCEAN YEARBOOK (1979).
5. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.
3, arts. 143-149 (1980).
6. Id. These activities include: marine scientific research (art. 143); transfer
of technology (art. 144); protection of human life (art. 146); accommodation of ac-
tivities in the Area and in the marine environment (art. 147); participation of de-
veloping States in the activities in the Area (art. 148); and archaelogical and
historical objects (art. 149).
7. Id. art. 165(2)(h).
8. Id. art. 165(2)(m).
carrying out their function of supervision and inspection."9
It is true that the Authority's functions of monitoring, surveil-
lance, and verification are restricted to "activities of exploration
for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area."'o But since
the Convention provides among the basic "Principles Governing
the Area" for the "use of the Area exclusively for peaceful pur-
poses,"" it would be logical to extend verification powers to make
sure that this principle is in fact complied with.
At Pacem in Maribus X12 proposals were put forward to utilize
the elaborate machinery of the Seabed Authority and the technol-
ogies which, under the Convention on the Law of the Sea, will be
transferred to it, for the purpose of monitoring, surveillance, and
verification of compliance with the prohibitions of the Seabed Dis-
armament Treaty. It was pointed out that multi-purpose systems
of monitoring and surveillance are far more economical and effec-
tive than specialized systems.
Luigi Migliorino of Italy, who introduced the proposal, wrote:
.... it is certainly desirable that the International Seabed Authority,
which is supposed to be impartial, assume verifying powers according to
the Seabed [Disarmament] Treaty. This new power could come either
through an amendment to the 1971 Seabed [Disarmament] Treaty, as the
present formulation does not permit it, or through the recognition of the
International Seabed Authority as a subsidiary organ of the General As-
sembly of the United Nations, in accordance with art. III, para. 4, of the
Seabed [Disarmament] Treaty.13
Dr. Migliorino also indicated a second point of entry for integrat-
ing development and disarmament functions of the Seabed Au-
thority:
Military activities conducted in the seas can produce pollution. Theoret-
ically at least, it is not excluded that nuclear weapons or weapons of mass
destruction, or other military installations considered in the Seabed [Dis-
armament] Treaty, could cause accidents resulting in the contamination
of the marine environment. In this case, there would be the problem of
seeing whether the mechanism for the prevention, control, and interven-
tion foreseen by international law, particularly by the new international
law of the sea (art. 199 and 221 of the ICNT/Rev.1) affects, and to 'what ex-
tent, the provisions of the Seabed [Disarmament] Treaty, especially those
concerning the verification powers of the States Parties. In other words,
in the case of imminent danger of pollution caused by a weapon or nu-
clear installation placed on the seabed, will the States threatened be able,
as foreseen in art. 199 and 221 of the ICNT/Rev.1, to take the necessary
measures for coming to grips with the danger, or will they have to follow
the long and complicated procedure foreseen in art. III of the Seabed Dis-
armament Treaty? The answer certainly lies in recognizing the pre-emi-
9. Id. art. 165(3).
10. Id. art. 1(3) (1980). Compare this definition with art. 143(1).
11. Id. art. 141.
12. INTERNATIONAL OCEAN INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS OF PACEM IN MARIBUS X
122 (1981).
13. L. IVGLIoRiNo, FONDI MARNI E Aam Di DisTRuzioNE DI MASSA 190 (1980).
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nence of the provisions of the ICNT/Rev.1. The purpose of the Seabed
[Disarmament] Treaty is to prohibit nuclear weapons and weapons of
mass destruction on the seabed and not to provide a juridical regulations
of the complex subject of pollution caused by radioactive substance. In
fact, the Treaty does not refer to this problem at all. The subject is, in-
stead, regulated by the provisions of the ICNT/Rev.1 which are general
and can also apply to the problem of military pollution.14
The procedure to achieve this integration between the two trea-
ties, and to build a cost-effective multi-purpose system of monitor-
ing and surveillance in the international Area, is easily
imaginable. As a first step, at the national level, it would be nec-
essary for the law of the sea teams and the disarmament teams
within ministries of foreign affairs of interested states to get to-
gether and form a common working group. This group should
elaborate a draft amendment to be submitted to the 1982 Review
Conference of the Seabed Disarmament Treaty. At the same
time, it should prepare proposals for the Preparatory Commission
of the Convention on the Law of the Sea.15 The Preparatory Com-
mission has a mandate to prepare the institutional aspects of the
Seabed Authority. The mandate includes the structuring of the
Legal and Technical Commission. The Preparatory Commission
should be instructed to structure the Legal and Technical Com-
mission in such a way that the monitoring and surveillance func-
tions described above insure compliance with the terms of the
Seabed Disarmament Treaty.
This course of action would remedy the lack of effective verifica-
tion powers under the Seabed Disarmament Treaty. It would also
set an important precedent for the establishment of international
verification procedures in other sectors of disarmament and arms
control. At the same time, it would serve to strengthen the Inter-
national Seabed Authority by assigning to it a concrete task for
the 1980's. This would come at a time when the purposes and
functions of the International Seabed Authority may have to be
re-examined in view of recent unanticipated developments in sea-
bed prospecting and exploration.
14. Id. at 190.
15. See Report of the President on the Work of the Informal Plenary on the
Preparatory Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L55 (1980); Note by the President
on the Proposed Preparatory Commission, PC/i of Mar. 3, 1980; and Informal Pro-
posal of the President of the Conference, PC/2 of Mar. 14, 1980.
RESEARCH AN) DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED
AUTHorry
Chile now has concrete plans to extract manganese nodules
from the seabed in the economic zone of the Juan Fernandez ar-
chipelago, which belongs to its South Pacific territories. These
plans were announced recently by the Chilean Minister of
Mines.16 The Minister indicated that the field was one of the larg-
est undersea mineral reserves in the world. The nodules are of
commercial grade and contain cobalt, copper, nickel, and manga-
nese. The Chilean Government, according to the Minister's state-
ment, will probably call world-wide tenders for involvement in the
project. The Government would be looking for partners with a
high level of technical expertise in mineral extraction. In the
meantime, the National Science Foundation of the United States
is planning an expedition in 1981, in which two Chilean experts
will participate.
The news came as a surprise to many who, through years of
painstaking work, had based the entire structure of their reason-
ing on the assumption that commercially exploitable manganese
nodules were to be found only in the Area beyond any possible
claim of national jurisdiction and that therefore the Authority was
in a monopoly position in negotiating the terms of any agreement
for manganese nodule mining with companies and States.
Yet Chile is not the only country that will mine nodules in ar-
eas under national jurisdiction. The exclusive economic zone of
Clarion Island, a possession of Mexico, contains nodules of prime
quality. This zone, thought until recently to belong to "the Area"
under the jurisdiction of the International Authority, is the Re-
gion that has been most thoroughly explored and offers the best
possibilities for commercial exploitation. It is more than likely
that Ecuador has nodules in its offshore areas and that France
has manganese nodules in the economic zones of its Polynesian
offshore possessions. The United States, already involved in
Chile, may have nodules in the Hawaiian zone.
Mining companies have made it clear that they prefer to mine
in areas under national jurisdiction. In such areas, mining con-
tracts or licenses can be obtained from individual governments
along traditional and well established lines. This is more attrac-
tive than having to deal with the International Seabed Authority
which, to them, is an unknown entity of cumbersome interna-
16. Chile Plans Seabed Mine, PAC. ISLANDs MoNTELY Aug. 1980, at 158.
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tional bureaucracy.17
Because of the world economic situation, including the oversup-
ply of land-based resources, the depression of prices, and the in-
stability of metal markets, seabed mining will get off to a slow
start. There will not be a rush of contracts before the end of the
century. If the few contracts that will be made are made with
coastal States, there may be very little left for the International
Seabed Authority, at least until the end of the century. Thus a
unique opportunity to create new forms of international economic
cooperation between North and South and new instruments for
technology transfer would be lost.
All this could and should have been predicted. This writer has
in fact predicted it ever since 1974.18 It was also clear that struc-
17. The possibilities of bilateral collaboration with coastal States are be-
coming increasingly important in view of the continuing legal uncertain-
ties with regard to the high seas .... The 200-mile EEZ opens the
possibility of bilateral cooperation in the exploration and exploitation of
all mineral resources in offshore areas .... As far as manganese nodules
are concerned, the 200-mile limit is somewhat narrow; only in exceptional
cases are deep sea nodules likely to be found within the 200-mile EEZ.
An extention of the 200-mile limit, no matter how problematic it might
be under other aspects, would transfer large portions of manganese nod-
ules from the realm of legal uncertainty into areas of individual State ju-
risdiction. In view of the vague provisions of the ICNT, we cannot help
noting that, as far as deep sea mining is concerned, the farther the EEZ is
extended into the deep oceans, the better it will be.
U. BoIn, PROTOKOL DES MEERSsymposruM KIEL 1980.
18. However, it has not been clearly pointed out that, as a result of pres-
ent trends in delimiting national jurisdiction, it may be anticipated that a
substantial part of the manganese nodules of the abyss would either pass
immediately under national jurisdiction or could be claimed by a coastal
State through appropriate adjustments within the baseline and other de-
limitation provisions likely to be included in any treaty adopted by the
Conference. Hence prospective exploiters of manganese nodules would,
in many cases, have the choice of exploitation either in the international
seabed area or within national jurisdiction. Thus the proposed interna-
tional seabed authority, in the event of a licensing or service contract sys-
tem of exploitation being adopted, would not be able freely to determine
royalty provisions within the international area nor would it be able to
adopt effective arrangements to ensure that mineral output from the sea-
bed will not result in prices which are not equitable to landbased produ-
cers, since attempts to impose conditions not acceptable to the limited
number of consortia interested in deep seabed exploitation would merely
result in most cases in such exploitation taking place within national juris-
diction.
Address by Elisabeth Mann Borgese, Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the
Sea, First Committee (August 6, 1974). See also A. PARDO AND E. BORGESE, THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIc ORDER AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (International
Ocean Institute Occasional Paper No. 4, 1977).
The basic assumptions underlying the establishment of an international
tural measures had to be taken to prevent the Authority from be-
coming a paper tiger. Such measures should consist in the
designing of a flexible joint venture system of exploitation, capa-
ble of operating in areas tinder both international and national ju-
risdiction. The controlling shares would be held by the Authority
in the international Area and by the coastal State in areas under
national jurisdiction.19 This would be a true parallel system, not
authority with the functions proposed are that the authority would enjoy a
virtual monopoly, at least in the exploration of the manganese nodules of
the abyss .... These assumptions, however, are now incorrect. Straight
baselines of unlimited length and acceptance of the archipelagic princi-
ples permit States to enclose extensive areas some of which contain man-
ganese nodules.... The proposed international Authority will not have
anything approaching a monopoly of manganese nodule exploration: man-
ganese nodules can, and will, be exploited within national jurisdiction.
From this basic fact flow a number of conclusions, inter alia:
(a) Whatever the norms contained in the proposed convention, the Au-
thority will not have the power to determine, at its discretion, the condi-
tions of manganese nodule exploration. The Authority will have to offer
conditions of exploration and exploitation no less favorable than those of-
fered by national authorities....
(c) Exploitation of significant quantities of manganese nodules will inevi-
tably seriously affect the price of cobalt and of manganese and may have
some effect on the price of other minerals. But, since manganese nodules
may be exploited both within and outside national jurisdiction, the Au-
thority will not be able to sustain prices merely by curtailing exploitation
in the international area. Curtailment of exploitation in the international
area, while reducing the revenue of the Authority, could easily be com-
pensated by increased production from areas under national jurisdiction.
Id. at 98-99.
19. Such a system was proposed in E. BORGESE, THE E TERaPaRSEs 4 (Interna-
tional Ocean Institute Occasional Paper No. 6, 1978). One of the purposes of the
system would be,\to cope with the eventuality, or certainty, that nodules will be
exploited, not only in the international area but also in areas under nationaljurir-
diction. "For Enterprises operating in areas under national jurisdiction, the
coastal State shall provide 52 percent of the investment capital while the Interna-
tional Seabed Authority shall provide at least 24 percent and the remaining 24 per-
cent or less may be provided by other Signatories." The comment to this proposed
article points out that this article has been;
added for the case, very likely to arise, that a substantial portion of man-
ganese nodules will in fact be mined in areas under national jurisdiction.
If this contingency is not considered, it might, in time, leave the Authority
without any business. Cooperation between the coastal State having ju-
risdiction over nodule sites and the Authority's enterprises must of course
be voluntary. For developing countries it certainly would be more benefi-
cial to cooperate with the Authority's Enterprises than to deal with indi-
vidual industrial States or private consortia. Developing States might,
through their appropriate forums, resolve to adopt such a policy. It would
of course be preferable if enough public pressure could be built to make of
this policy international good practice. In other words, the manganese
nodules of the deep ocean floor should be considered common heritage of
mankind, no matter on which side of the limit of national jurisdiction they
happen to lie. This could be achieved through a non-binding recommen-
dation by the Council or the Assembly.
Id. at 4.
For enterprises operating in areas under national jurisdiction, the Board
shall be composed of (a) 13 representatives of Signatories [board mem-
bers] designated by the coastal State having jurisdiction in the area; (b)
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polarized between the interests of the North and those of the
South. Based on a functional rather than a territorial interpreta-
tion of the "limits of national jurisdiction," and safeguarding the
principle that the resources of the seabed are the common heri-
tage of mankind and must be exploited for the benefit of mankind
as a whole, with special consideration for the needs and interests
of developing countries.
It is not too late to adopt a workable solution to this problem.
Most mining contracts will not be made before the late 1980's. In
addition to market constraints, companies are still struggling with
technological constraints, including the extensive research and
development required before the nodule mining industry can be
fully commercialized. Companies in West Germany, the United
States, and Canada are hesitant to make the necessary invest-
ments without government subsidies. Consortia are being dis-
solved and seabed mining capacity is being dismantled and
placed "on the back-burner." When the world picture changes
and the resources are needed, the whole machinery will have to
be re-assembled at a considerable loss of time and money.20 Only
Japan is far-sighted enough to subsidize its deep-sea mining in-
dustry and keep it in readiness. 21
What should be proposed is a joint venture on research, devel-
opment, exploration, and the establishment of a pilot processing
plant between the International Seabed Authority and any com-
panies and States that desire to participate. Only half of the in-
vestment cost should be borne by industry. The other half could
be divided between the home States of the participating compa-
up to and not more than 6 representatives representing the largest invest-
ment shares in the Enterprise, which shall amount to up to and not more
than 24 percent of the total investment capital of the Enterprise; (c) at
least 6 Signatories elected by the Assembly of the International Seabed
Authority, on nomination by the Council, in order to ensure that the prin-
ciple of just geographical representation is taken into account, with due
regard to the interests of developing countries, of labor, and of consumers.
Id. at 7.
20. The fate of coal mines in West Germany was similiar. Only a decade ago
these rich mines were abandoned and coal gasification technologies were put on
the back burner. Now these mines and technologies have to be restored at a con-
siderable loss of time and money.
21. Seabed mining is not the only sector in which Japanese industry and gov-
ernment show an almost unique sense of foresight. The computer industry, espe-
cially in the robot sector, is another area where Japan has an incredible lead.
Japan presently has about 10,000 robots in action while the United States has 3,000
and West Germany 850. See TIME, Dec. 8, 1980, at 75.
nies, who would thus subsidize their industries collectively
through the Authority. This system would considerably reduce
costs and could be supplemented by funding from public interna-
tional organizations such as the World Bank.
The advantages of this system for the industrialized mining
States would be considerable. They would be supportin.g their
ailing mining industries while providing an opportunity for spin-
offs to other industries. They would maintain continuity in pre-
paring for commercial production. In addition, they would de-
velop and utilize their technologies while enhancing international
trade in these technologies.
This system would give smaller industrial States an opportunity
to participate in seabed mining which they otherwise would not
have had. These smaller industrial States could become partners
in such a joint venture, while developing countries would be rep-
resented by the Authority. The developing States would benefit
through technology transfers to the Authority as well as from par-
ticipation in the management of a scientific technological venture.
This would provide developing States an opportunity to begin de-
veloping their own internal seabed mining infrastructure. Coun-
tries like Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico who intended to exploit
nodules in areas under their national jurisdiction would probably
be the first ones to join such a venture.
The preparation of a joint venture on research, development,
and exploration would be justified on the basis of article 143 of
the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea.22 The Preparatory
Commission should be instructed to initiate preparations for co-
operative arrangements for this kind of applied scientific research
and development under article 143.23
A joint venture on research and development, at this stage,
22. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.
3, art. 143(2) (1980):
The Authority may carry out marine scientific research concerning the
Area and its resources, and may enter into contracts for that purpose. The
Authority shall promote and encourage the conduct of marine scientific
research in the Area, and shall coordinate and disseminate the results of
such research and analysis when available.
23. The resolution to be adopted by the Conference providing interim arrange-
ments for the International Seabed Authority and the Law of the Sea Tribunal
provides in para. 5 that "ftjhe Commission shall make studies, prepare and draft
rules, regulations and procedures relating to Article 16 of Annex II to the Conven-
tion, as it deems necessary to enable the Authority to initiate activities in the in-
ternational seabed area." Informal Proposal by the President of the Conference,
Pc 12 of Mar. 14, 1980. Article 16 refers to the "Exclusive right to explore and ex-
ploit," and guarantees security of tenure to contractors. Id. art. 16. There is noth-
ing in the Draft Treaty that would prevent the preparations for a joint venture as
proposed here.
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would in no way prejudice the organization of commercial ex-
ploitation at a later stage, whether under national or international
jurisdiction. If the venture is successful, however, the chances for
continuing the joint venture system, as already provided for in
the Draft Convention,24 will increase considerably, and thus the
problem of exploitation of nodules in areas under national juris-
diction will be minimized.
Exploration for mineral resources under the sovereignty of de-
veloping countries through public international organizations
rather than through private multinational companies appears to
be in line with current developments in the building of a new in-
ternational economic order. In many instances private industry
shows little inclination to bear the costs of mineral exploration in
the least developed countries. Profits are not high enough. For
such contingencies, the Government of Canada has recently es-
tablished a new State-controlled company, Petrocanada Interna-
tional. This company has the specific task of exploring for
petroleum in joint venture with some of the least developed coun-
tries. Canada has already initiated discussions with Mexico and
Venezuela to join in this new form of international development
cooperation. 25 If this is possible in the case of oil exploration, it
should be all the more so in the case of nodule exploration. To
link such ventures to the Authority would seem to be the most
logical and efficient way to proceed.
The Preparatory Commission could be instructed to proceed
along these lines. In this context, it might be advisable to amend
subparagraph (e) of paragraph 4 of the "Resolution to be Adopted
24. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.
3, Annex III, art. 11 (1980).
25. Because of this sense of interdependence in the face of the world en-
ergy problem, the government's National Energy Program, which I tabled
with my recent Budget, contained an important initiative to help oil im-
porting developing countries. A new firm, Petro-Canada International, will
e created to explore for oil solely in developing areas, where multina-
tional companies are often reluctant to invest. Preliminary discussions
have already taken place with the state oil companies of Mexico and Ven-
ezuela, in connection with a major joint effort to assist petroleum develop-
ment in Latin America and the Caribbean. Some $250 million has been
allocated to this program. The program will reflect our development
assistance objectives. It will be aimed at finding oil in countries which
now must import it.
Address by the Hon. Allan J. MacEachen, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Finance, Government of Canada, Third Annual Session of the North South Round
Table (November 16, 1980).
by the Conference Providing Interim Arrangements for the Inter-
national Sea-Bed Authority and the Law of the Sea Tribunal"26 to
the effect that the Commission shall "prepare recommendations
concerning the relationship' not only "between the United Na-
tions, its specialized organizations and agencies, and the Author-
ity," but also between States and mining companies and the
Authority. Unless the Commission can deal, in a provisional and
recommendatory manner, with States and mining companies, its
preparatory work will remain incomplete.
CONCLUSIONS
Recent developments make it probable that the International
Seabed Authority will not be able to perform the main function
for which it is being established. Seabed mining will most likely
be carried out in areas under national jurisdiction in accordance
with the preferences of coastal States and private companies. A
unique opportunity for creating new forms of North-South eco-
nomic cooperation would thus be lost. To avoid this danger it is
suggested that the Preparatory Commission be instructed to ex-
amine and, as far as possible, strengthen the other functions of
the Authority, as provided for in the Draft Convention. Particular
attention should be given to monitoring and surveillance and to
scientific research and development.
The scope of the monitoring and surveillance activities of the
Seabed Authority should be expanded so as to include verifica-
tion of compliance with the terms of the Seabed Disarmament
Treaty and enforcement of the Draft Convention's principle of the
reservation of the Area exclusively for peaceful purposes. The
Seabed Disarmament Treaty should be amended accordingly at
the forthcoming Review Conference in 1982. The Preparatory
Commission should be instructed to prepare the necessary insti-
tutional arrangements within the Authority in order to take over
the monitoring and surveillance activities required by the Seabed
Disarmament Treaty.
With regard to scientific research, it is suggested that a joint
venture for research, development, exploration, and the construc-
tion of a processing pilot plant should be established as quickly
as possible between the Authority, States and mining companies
that wish to participate. The Preparatory Commission should be
instructed to make the necessary preparations in accordance with
article 143 of the Draft Convention.
26. Informal Proposal by the President of the Conference, PC/2 of Mar. 14,
1980, Subpara. (e) of para. 4 (1980).
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To facilitate the work of the Preparatory Commission in these
fields, it is suggested that subparagraph (e) of paragraph 4 of the
Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission be amended
so as to cover the relations between the Authority and States and
mining companies. Such a course of action would ensure that the
Authority has concrete tasks and functions in the 1980's. It would
enhance new forms of economic cooperation between the North
and the South, and it would simultaneously strengthen the causes
of development, disarmament, and environment.

